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Abstract—The presence of security vulnerabilities in automo-
tive networks has already been shown by various publications
in recent years. Due to the specification of the Controller
Area Network (CAN) as a broadcast medium without security
mechanisms, attackers are able to read transmitted messages
without being noticed and to inject malicious messages. In order
to detect potential attackers within a network or software system
as early as possible, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are
prevalent. Many approaches for vehicles are based on techniques
which are able to detect deviations from specified CAN network
behaviour regarding protocol or payload properties. However, it
is challenging to detect attackers who secretly connect to CAN
networks and do not actively participate in bus traffic. In this
paper, we present an approach that is capable of successfully
detecting unknown CAN devices and determining the distance
(cable length) between the attacker device and our sensing unit
based on Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) technique. We
evaluated our approach on a real vehicle network.
Index Terms—anomaly detection; automotive security; con-
troller area network; intrusion detection
I. INTRODUCTION
The automotive industry has been undergoing a major
transformation process in recent years [1]. One topic in this
transformation process is the information security of vehicle
networks, which have become a major focus of Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and suppliers due several
cyber-attacks [2], in order to be able to primarily ensure the re-
liability of interconnected systems. This has already resulted in
various security specifications for AUTomotive Open System
ARchitecture (AUTOSAR) [3] and the SAE/ISO 21434 [4]
standard which is currently in draft. At the same time, more
and more intelligent mechanisms are under development to
recognize an attacker at an early stage of the attack. One
such intelligent technique for the detection of attacks are IDSs
which can be divided into two types [5]. First, techniques
that use unusual behaviour or signatures from data streams
to infer the presence of attackers [6], [7]. Second, signature-
based techniques that are focused on specific patterns in the
network to detect malicious actions. Unfortunately, signature-
based techniques are not capable to detect unknown attacks
(zero-day) due the missing attack pattern (i.e. the attack
signature). Based on the assumption that attack techniques
become more and more sophisticated, there is the possibility
that attacks can be designed in a way that they are not
detectable by pattern techniques. On the other hand, behaviour-
based approaches are able to identify such unknown attacks
due to consideration of unusual behaviour in the information
flow of transmission channels. There are already behaviour-
based approaches for the CAN bus which use deviations
from physical characteristics (voltage, current or frequency)
of transmitted messages as identification criteria [8], [9], [10],
[11]. These approaches require a synchronization property like
the Acknowledgement (ACK) bit or static sections of the CAN
frame. Moreover, it is only possible to recognize unknown
devices if at least one control unit sends messages which
excludes the detection of attackers while the CAN bus is in
idle mode.
Problem: Existing approaches can only recognize unknown
devices if at least one ECU sends out a message and they are
bound to fixed parts of the CAN frame.
Approach: We present an approach which is able to
physically determine whether an unwanted participant has
connected to a CAN network. For the detection of unknown
participants, the proposed approach is not limited to the
protocol structure which distinguishes it from other techniques.
Furthermore, the position of the attacker in the network can
be calculated.
Contribution: We show a structured procedure for the
selection and combination of techniques, which makes it
possible to recognize an unwanted participant on the CAN bus.
In contrast to other approaches, the proposed sensing technique
is able to detect an unwanted participant even if no ECU sends
a message (bus is in idle state). This also allows to scan for
new participants while the vehicle is sleeping (e.g. vehicle is
in parking mode) to identify activities such as adding new
participants or removing an existing Electronic Control Unit
(ECU) over a certain period of time (e.g. for tuning purposes).
Furthermore, we demonstrate that the approach is also
capable of determining the distance (cable length) between the
unwanted participant and our detection unit. In addition to a
simulative evaluation, which serves for analysis and evaluation
of potential detection techniques, we show an application of
the approach on a real vehicle network with several ECUs. The
presented approach can either be used in isolation or integrated
into existing IDSs to improve their detection capabilities.
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II. RELATED WORK
The authors Choi et al. [9] present a method to identify
ECUs by using signal characteristics of transmitted CAN
messages. They propose different statistical features based on
time and frequency for the measured signals. These features
are created for each CAN message as a kind of fingerprint.
Subsequently, an artificial neural network is trained with
supervised learning in order to detect deviating characteristics
in transmitted CAN messages. For the evaluation they used
different developer boards as well as corresponding laboratory
equipment such as an oscilloscope. In addition, the researchers
state a misclassification rate of 0.36 %. The limitation of
their approach is on the non-detection of pure eavesdropping
attacks. A downside of this approach is that the fingerprinting
depends on the CAN protocol. This leads to the situation that
a change of the protocol structure, e.g, as it is necessary with
CAN-FD, leads to an adaptation of the evaluation algorithm
and thus to a firmware update. Furthermore, the detection
algorithm requires that at least one participant sends out a
CAN message. If this is not the case, an unknown participant
cannot be detected.
Kneib and Huth developed Scission [10] which also uses
physical characteristics (analog values) that belong to the
CAN frame to recognize a participant. Scission improves the
approach from Choi et al. [9] due to minimizing resource
requirements. The researcher have reduced the sampling rate
by a factor of 125 as well as replaced the neural network
engine with a logistic regression. The latter allows to model
the distribution of dependent discrete variables [12]. Thus, the
individual bits of the CAN frames are analyzed and distributed
to three groups. By looking at the individual groups it is
then possible to make relevant characteristics more visible.
The researchers were able to reduce the false positive, with
an average probability for transmitter detection of 99.85%.
The value was achieved in an evaluation with two production
vehicles and a prototype. The system is further able to identify
unmonitored and additional devices. As Scission is based
on the work of Choi et al. and is conceptually comparable
(i.e. using the CAN-frames), the same drawbacks apply for
Scission.
A further voltage level based approach for intrusion de-
tection was presented in [11] by the authors Cho and Shin
with Viden. The detection method uses mainly the ACK-
bit voltage threshold of each CAN message for creating
specific voltage profiles and maps these characteristics on
the legitimate ECUs. During the runtime, the IDS update the
voltage profiles permanently. If an attack is identified by their
system, a voltage profile of the malicious message is created.
The profile then allows an assignment of which ECU sent
the malicious message. The limitations of the method are
the following. In case, the attacker ECU does not send any
messages, no voltage profile can be created for this device.
Furthermore, if the attacker uses a valid message with modified
payload of an compromised ECU, a detection is impossible.
Attacks regarding eavesdropping are also out of scope.
III. BACKGROUND
The following sections show the relevant fundamentals
regarding the signal transmission and physical properties of
the CAN.
A. Transmission Line
For the transmission of CAN messages in vehicles, un-
shielded twisted pair cables are usually used in vehicles. In
transmission-line theory, this type of line is classified in the
category of homogeneous twin wires [13]. In Figure 1 a typical
CAN network as well as the transmission line model is shown.
It represents an infinite series of fundamental components.
The illustrated model shows an infinitely short part of the
transmission line. The model includes four elements depending
on the their length ∆z:
• Distributed resistance R′ (series of resistors expressed in
Ω
m )• Conductance G′ (due to the dielectric material of the
transmission line expressed in Sm )• Distributed inductance L′ (series of inducers expressed
in Hm )• Capacitance C ′ (due to the two transmission lines ex-
pressed in Fm )
The telegrapher’s equations [14], defined by Heaviside in
the 1880s, describes the current and voltage on such a trans-
mission line depending on distance and time. The equations
considering the limit ∆z → 0:
∂I
∂z
= −G′V − C ′ ∂V
∂t
(1)
∂V
∂z
= −R′I − L′ ∂I
∂t
(2)
This leads to the characteristic impedance Z0:
Z0 =
√
R′ + jwL′
G′ + jwC ′
(3)
The characteristic impedance is generally a property of the
used line, which depends on geometry and material. The
assumption as a lossless line (R′  jwL′ and G′  jwC ′)
leads to the characteristic impedance becoming real. As a
result, the following equation is derived:
Z0 =
√
L′
C ′
(4)
For transmission lines in CAN networks, the ISO 11898 [15]
define cables with a characteristic impedance of 120 Ω. To
avoid signal reflections, each transmission line should be
equipped with a terminating resistor (Rt, s. Figure 1), which
is equal to Z0.
ECU1 ECUn
RtRt
C′∆z
L′∆zR
′∆z
G′∆z
ECU2
Fig. 1: Typical CAN network with ECUs, termination resistors (Rt), corresponding transmission line model with elementary
components specified per unit length (R′ = Distributed resistance, G′ = Conductance , L′ = Distributed inductance, C ′ =
Capacitance)
B. Time Domain Reflectometry
TDR [16] describes a technique for applying an impulse to
a line in order to evaluate the reflected signal, which is often
used for detecting errors (e.g. line interruption) in telecommu-
nication lines. A reflection occurs at each impedance jump on
the line, which can be caused by stub lines. By determining the
runtime of the reflected pulse, the length between measuring
point and impedance shift can be calculated. The typical TDR
structure (s. Figure 2) includes a pulse generator, oscilloscope
and a power splitter.
Impulse generator Power
Oscilloscope
Transmission line
DUT
splitter
Rt
Fig. 2: Setup of TDR measurement technique
IV. APPROACH
For the detection of an anonymous device in CAN networks,
we present our selection process of suitable physical charac-
teristics. As a second step, we present our simulation model
to evaluate potential data analysis techniques.
A. Analyzing Suitable Measurement Techniques
1) Ohmic Resistance: An approach to detect a new par-
ticipant on the bus is to evaluate the ohmic resistance of the
network. Each participant is connected to the bus via a CAN
transceiver. This transceiver has a specific input resistance. If
several of these transceivers are now connected to one bus,
the total resistance results from the parallel connection of all
input resistors as well as the termination resistors.
A new participant reduces the overall resistance of the
network. A typical value for the input resistance of a CAN
transceiver is 70 kΩ. This value is very high compared to
those of the termination resistors with 120 Ω. The change in
resistance due to the parallel connection of a high-impedance
resistor to a low-impedance resistor (Rt) is only very small.
For clarification, an example calculation is given here. The
total resistance for two participants (R1, R2) of the CAN
bus with terminating resistance can be calculated using the
following equation (without transmission line resistance):
Rtot =
(
1
Rt,1
+
1
Rt,2
+
1
R1
+
1
R2
)−1
(5)
With a terminating resistor of 120 Ω and input resistors
of the CAN transceivers (70 kΩ) [17] the result is Rges =
59.8973 Ω. If an additional participant would have been added
to the network, there would be a minor change of ∆R =
0.0512 Ω which becomes even smaller for systems with many
participants.
Furthermore, each CAN transceiver can be considered as
a spare voltage source with internal resistance. If several
transceivers transmit simultaneously, the voltage sources are
connected in parallel with an internal resistance. Depending on
how many participants are currently transmitting a recessive
level, the voltage on the bus also changes slightly. The ACK
bit is a state in which all connected participants simultaneously
output a recessive level. Using the ACK bit for reliable partic-
ipant recognition is not suitable, since a malicious participant
could simply ignore the ACK request in order to remain
undetected (this drawback applies to Viden [11]).
2) Impedance: The impedance measurement uses a net-
work analyzer to measure the input reflection factor in a spe-
cific frequency range. According to transmission line theory,
the input impedance of the entire bus network should change if
an additional device is connected to the bus. This measurement
was carried out in a laboratory and showed that impedance
changes were hardly measurable when an additional device
was attached.
3) Reflection Through Stub Lines: Another possibility to
detect an additional node on the bus is to evaluate the impulse
response of the CAN network. Each participant on the CAN
(whether terminated or not) is represented by a non-ideal
terminating resistor. As a result, the impedance changes at
each line stub and at the transmitter-receiver side which causes
reflections. These reflections can be recorded using TDR and
evaluated for participant recognition. However, the damping
property of the transmission lines could become problematic,
since the reflected signals are only very weak and can be lost
by passing the line.
4) Selection of Suitable Technique: The first technique has
already been investigated and applied by various researchers.
The methods are based on changes of voltage and frequency
of transmitted signals, which are triggered by variations in the
ohmic resistance. In addition, the second measuring technique
(impedance) turns out to be unsuitable due to practical lab
tests. As a result we decided on the TDR technique, which
is already used in other domains for similar purposes (error
detection in telecommunication lines). Moreover, TDR offers
the advantage of detecting additional devices even if there is
no active bus communication.
B. Simulation Model
The circuit simulation program LTSPICE [18] is used to
simulate the CAN network. A simulation model is created
which has the structure of a linear bus and both ends are
provided with a corresponding terminating resistor. From the
actual bus line, short stub lines are routed to the individual
participants. The simulation model is used to analyze the effect
by adding a participant to the TDR reflection image as well
as finding the best analysis method for anomaly detection.
1) Transmission Line: To simulate the CAN line, LTSPICE
provides the model of an ideal line (transmission line). The
model has two parameters. One is the characteristic impedance
and the other is the delay time required for a wave to pass
through the line. The characteristic impedance is based on
a twisted two-wire line, which is typically used in vehicles.
The RF simulation program QUCS-Studio [19] can be used to
calculate the characteristic impedance of a line. The values of
Table I have been used in accordance with the CAN standard
ISO 11898 [15].
TABLE I: Cable characteristics according to ISO 11898 [15]
Property Value
Cable type Twisted pair cable
Wire diameter 0.657 mm
Diameter with isolation 1.1 mm
Length 1 m, 100 Twists (twisting)
The line calculation tool provides a characteristic impedance
of approximately 117 Ω. In addition, the phase angle (caused
by delay) is calculated. This angle can be converted into a
time delay for the LTSPICE model by assuming the typical
velocity of prorogation in lines of v = 2 ·108 ms , which results
in v = 23 c. Since the characteristic impedance of a typical
CAN network is different to the impedance of commonly used
oscilloscopes and impulse generators, a matching circuit is
necessary to suppress the introduction of additional reflections,
caused by the measurement equipment.
2) CAN Transceiver: For the simulation of the CAN par-
ticipants, a simple substitute circuit for emulating the input
impedance of a CAN transceiver is created. The equivalent
circuit consists of a high-resistance input and a small parasitic
input capacity (see Figure 3).
70inR k 
16inC pF
Fig. 3: Model of a simulated CAN transceiver, showing the
typical internal resistance and capacity.
The typical values from a CAN transceiver data sheet
were adopted as values for resistance (70 kΩ) and capacity
(16 pF) [17].
C. Data Analysis Techniques
In order to detect a variation of the transmission line proper-
ties, the reflection behavior of the bus has to be evaluated and
continuously compared with a reference signal. The reference
signal VRef (t) represents the normal reflection behavior as
voltage over time of the unmodified CAN network. In contrast,
the signal VAct(t) refers to the actual measured reflection
behavior in the network (see Figure 4).
In Figure 4, three signal courses are shown, which represent
the reflection behavior due to physical changes in the CAN
network. The blue signal can be considered as reference
signal since all ECUs in the network are connected. If several
devices get disconnected from the bus, a changing reflection
behavior occurs, represented by the red and orange signals,
respectively. In order to detect an additional or missing device,
it is necessary to compare the previously recorded reference
signal with the other signal courses. For this purpose, various
data analysis techniques were investigated, which are briefly
described below.
1) Mean Squared Error (MSE): A simple method to obtain
a scale for the difference between two signal courses, is to
determine the MSE [20]. For this purpose, the distance of
the measured signal from the reference signal is determined
and squared at each point of the respective functions. In this
case, the determined distances between the two function curves
TABLE II: Comparison of the different analysis techniques: - no change detected, (X) change partially detected, Xchange
continuously detected. The top row shows the seven ECUs (ARS, DME, DSC, eetc. ) of the Powertrain-CAN which were used
for evaluation of the four analysis techniques.
ARS DME DSC EKP Light Engine SZL LWS
Mean Square Error X X X X X - X
Correlation Analysis X X X (X) X X (X)
RQCC X X X X X - X
Coherence Analysis X X X X X X X
Fig. 4: Course of signal reflections by separation of different
CAN participants. The blue curve represents VRef (t) and the
other two different VAct,i(t). For details see text.
represent the errors. The method weighs greater differences
more strongly by squaring the errors, and eliminates negative
signs. The result is the mean value for the error set, where a
larger mean square error indicates a larger difference between
the two curves. This can be used to determine whether a
significant change in the measurement signal is detected and
whether an unknown participant is present. The low amount
of computation is an advantage of this method. However,
an offset error has a negative effect on the calculation. This
increases the error at any time, even if the signals show the
same changes. Noise also has a significant influence on the
result. Since the voltage levels are very low due to the damping
of the matching circuit and the power splitter, a voltage peak
can make the error large compared to the actual difference.
Since the error is squared, a voltage peak caused by noise has
a big influence on the result.
2) Cross Correlation Analysis: Cross-correlation analysis
is a generalization of standard linear correlation analysis. It is
a method of determining the strength of a relationship between
two measured time series [21]. If a correlation is found (r = 1)
between two time series, it means that if one time series is
changed systematically, the other time series is also changed
systematically. Where the value 1 for the correlation coefficient
r means a maximum similarity and the value 0 means no
correlation between the signals [22]. In this case r = 1
represents a CAN bus without an unknown participant and
a value of r < 1 for a CAN bus with an unknown participant.
3) Robust Quantitative Comparison Criterion (RQCC):
Since both the correlation analysis and the quadratic error
perform an evaluation in the time domain, methods in the
frequency domain were also considered. One such method is
the Robust Quantitative Comparison Criterion [23]. It is a
robust method to compare two signals by the Sobolev norm
(HS) in order to determine a difference. The latter presents
itself as a distance norm between two functions and contains
both phase and amplitude information [23].
4) Coherence Analysis: The coherence assesses the
strength of the dependency between the two time signals at
a given angular frequency [24]. Thus, it estimates to which
extent the measured signal (VAct) of the reference signal
(VRef ) can be predicted by an optimal linear function of the
least squares. The result is a coherence value between 0 and
1 where the value 1 describes the absolute correspondence
between the two signals. In our case the value 1 represents no
unknown participant on the CAN bus, e.g, VAct = VRef .
D. Evaluation of Analysis Methods
For the evaluation of the different analysis methods, the
measurements were examined using the simulated vehicle
network. In order to obtain a meaningful result, all algorithms
use the same signal sections. If the signals are considered
over the entire measurement range, only a marginal change
in the characteristic quantity is obtained when the network
is changed. The latest reflection is limited in time by the
length of the CAN bus, which is why a longer observation
does not bring any advantage, but only adds disturbances to
the evaluation. That is why only a small part of the signal
is considered and the averaged signal is compared with the
reference value. A part of a certain length is taken from both
the averaged signal and the reference signal around the point
with the largest difference in magnitude and transferred to the
detection technique.
The study of the various methods of analysis showed that
the coherence analysis was able to identify all seven ECUs and
thus outperformed the other techniques, which is presented in
Table II. In contrast to the other analysis methods, the output
value of the coherence analysis is zero, even if a small physical
change (e.g. cable movement) has been made to the network.
This can be explained by the detection of peaks. A peak is only
detected as such at a certain peak value, since no peaks in the
coherence calculation exceed the value, no peak is detected
and thus the characteristic value remains zero.
1) Extended Coherence Analysis: We modified the original
coherence analysis with the weighted phase angle to include
the phase information. Below we show these modifications of
the original approach, which is represented by Equation 6.
C(w) =
Cr(w)
2
fx(w)2fy(w)2
(6)
With fx(w) as spectral power density of x and fy(w) as
spectral power density of y, the coherence C(w) can reach
values of [0; 1] [25] and where fx(w)2, fy(w)2 are the auto-
spectral density of fx and fy . Related to our method, fx
corresponds to the reference reflections (Vref (t)) and fy to
the reflections during the active search (VAct(t)). Furthermore,
Cr(w) represents the cross-spectral density of fx(w) and
fy(w) [26]. If the signals x and y contain different spectral
components, peaks occur in the coherence at the frequencies
at which the spectra differs.
Since the phase information is lost through pure coherence,
the phase of the cross spectral power density ϕPxy(ejw) is
additionally taken into account for this evaluation method.
ϕPxy(ejw) = ∠Pxy(ejw) (7)
where Pxy(ejw) is calculated as follows:
Pxy(e
jw) =
∞∑
m=−∞
RExy(m)e
−jwm (8)
with
RExy(m) =
∞∑
n=−∞
y(n + m)x∗(n) (9)
Where Pxy(ejw) is the spectral cross power density [27]
and Rxy(m) is defined as cross correlation (x∗ is the complex
conjugate of function x) [28]. The coherence has a value of
C(w) = 1 with identical frequency components. The above-
mentioned peaks are now detected and their value weighted
with the magnitude of the phase at the frequency position. The
sum of the weighted peaks is the final result of our extended
coherence analysis.
K =
∑
(1− C(w))|ϕPxy(w)| (10)
V. EVALUATION
For the evaluation we carried out the following steps, which
would correspond to the sequences in a real application.
1) TDR measurement by transmitting a pulse with a width
of 3ns to determine the reference signal Vref (t).
2) Determine the threshold for detection of an unknown
participant.
3) Start the continuous detection using TDR (→ VAct(t))
and the extended coherence analysis (see Sec-
tion IV-D1).
4) Evaluate the result of the extended coherence analysis
and derive the existence of an alien device.
For the detection of physical changes in the observed CAN
network, a series of reflections was recorded for calculation
of a reference value. At the start of the measurement, all
CAN control units are connected to the bus. In order to avoid
measurement influences, none of the ECUs were supplied
with power. Subsequently, a control unit was sequentially
uncoupled and 1000 measurements were recorded. This re-
vealed a visible change in the reflection pattern with each
pulled off powertrain CAN transceiver (please see the three
reflections in Figure 4). In this case, even the control unit
with the highest distance (dynamic stability control) still
showed a visible change of the signal. Furthermore, the results
of the measurements showed that when each control unit
was disconnected, the measured value was above the defined
threshold of 0 (see Figure 5). Therefore, all changes could
be unambiguously detected in this experiment. However, the
smallest measured value of the SZL LWS-ECU shows a value
of 0.037, which is close to the detection limit.
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Fig. 5: Box plot of the evaluation of measured values with the
extended coherence analysis (see above) with physical changes
of the CAN. The threshold value is shown as a red line. The
red crosses are outliers coming from a source of disturbance.
Since CAN messages are constantly transmitted on the
bus during driving, the recognition has to operate reliably in
this state. As a result, the transmitted bits may overlap the
measurement. This may influence the reflection pattern, which
could lead to incorrect detection. Therefore, the measured
signals have to be checked before detecting an attack on an
overlay with a message.
A. Attack Scenario with Real Vehicle Network
To reproduce a possible attack scenario, we used the CAN
network shown in Figure 6 with predefined cable length shown
in Table I. During the measurement, we added an additional
CAN node (Alien Device) to the network.
Prior to the attack, 300 measurement series were recorded
as reference values (V Ref (t)). To reduce the noise, 30 mea-
surement series were averaged V Act(t) and then compared
with the reference signal (V Ref (t)). Just before the 26th
measurement, the unknown device was connected to the CAN
bus, which resulted in a significant change in the measurement
value at the 26th point (see red dotted line in Figure 7).
DME
Engine
ARS
DSC
SZL_LWS
Light
EKP
KBM
Dash 
Board
CAS
ASCM
Unknown 
Device
Detection 
Device
P o
w
e r
t r
a i
n -
C
A
N
C
o m
f o
r t
- C
A
N
Fig. 6: Attack scenario, represented by the Powertrain-CAN
with seven connected ECUs as well as the alien and the
detection device.
TABLE III: Distance between ECUs and detection device
ECU Distance
EKP 8.31 m
Light 5.95 m
SZL LWS 7.05 m
DSC 13.5 m
ARS 12.79 m
Engine 4.11 m
Unknown Device 9.86 m
DME 8.65 m
Device detected
Fig. 7: Evaluation of an attack based on coherence calculation
Since both normal and attack values are available for this
averaged measurement, the 26th calculated value, as shown in
Figure 7, is not as high as the following. There is however
already a clear shift in the coherence value due to the attack,
which would be detected with this method. We were also able
to determine the exact distance of 9.8 m (see Table I) between
the measuring point and the attacker. The number of averages
for defining the reference value is crucial for the evaluation. If
too few values are averaged, an attack is sometimes incorrectly
detected without changes to the network.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, it was shown that changes in the physical
properties of a CAN network can be detected and used for
attacker detection. With the combination of a time domain
reflectometry and a coherence analysis it is demonstrated that
unauthorized CAN participants can be detected reliably. By
an evaluation on a real vehicle network, the applicability
of the approach has been shown. Since the alien device
was successfully detected, an enhanced version of this attack
detection mechanism could be used in the automotive industry.
In order to avoid possible impairments with regard to the
active bus communication, a measurement in vehicle operation
could always take place during a transmission stop. For the
CAN protocol, an Intermission Frame Space (IFS) is specified,
which separates consecutive messages.
In addition, it would also be conceivable to integrate the
method into diagnostic devices in order to locate line inter-
ruptions. Audit organizations would also be able to detect ad-
ditional devices during the general inspection, for example to
detect unauthorized tuning devices during the main inspection.
Overall, this method is not limited to CAN networks, but is
generally suitable for all networks based on bus technology.
This allows the application in large industrial plants using,
e.g., ProfiBus or CANopen.
Further research will focus on the design of a hardware
unit suitable for automotive applications, which integrates
the oscilloscope, pulse generator and evaluation algorithm. In
order to improve the detection technique, a Moving Average
Filter could be implemented. This would allow the reference
signal to adapt to slow changes in the network properties
caused, e.g., by changes in temperature or cable movement.
We would like to point out that our proposed detection
technique is not intended to be a replacement for the existent
approaches in section II, but rather a useful extension of these
published techniques.
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